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A DIFFERENT VOICE:
THE FEMININE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE MINNESOTA STATE SUPREME COURT
LINDA S. MAULE*
Introduction
In 1991, the Minnesota State Supreme Court became the
first high court in the United States where women achieved
majority status-four of the seven justices were female. This was
an extraordinary achievement in light of the fact that at that time
approximately twenty percent of the state supreme courts did not
have any female justices. Nonetheless, this historic first is not only
an important accomplishment for those concerned with equal
representation on the courts, it also presents researchers with the
unprecedented opportunity to test Carol Gilligan's different voice
theory,2 and Sue Thomas's different voice and critical mass
theories.
3
Gender and politics scholarship has cited widely theories of
the differences women may make in public life. Gilligan's theory
argues that women tend to approach moral dilemmas in a manner
distinct from men. This theory has become increasingly popular in
legal scholarship. Nonetheless, public law scholarship has tended
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Director, Legal Studies Program,
Secondary Appointment, Women's Studies Program, Indiana State University.
Ph.D. Political Science, American Institutions and Processes, Washington State
University, August 1997. M.A. Political Science, American Institutions and
Processes, Washington State University, May 1993. B.A. Criminal Justice,
Washington State University, December 199 1. Co-author of CHARLES SHELDON
& LINDA MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE (1997).
1 This is no longer the case. None of the women who made up the majority now
sit on the bench.
2 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
3 See SUE THOMAS, How WOMEN LEGISLATE (1994).
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to overlook the implications of Thomas's theory. Thomas found
that women legislators despite differences in political orientation
tend to develop their own distinctive set of priorities and that a
critical point may exist where female legislators no longer feel an
overriding obligation to represent women as a class.
Because public law scholars have overlooked the
implications of Thomas's theories with respect to affect female
justices have on state appellate courts, an analysis was conducted
to determine whether a state appellate court with a female majority
acts in accord with the above theories. This analysis relied upon a
unique data set based on the judicial decisions rendered by the
Minnesota State Supreme Court from 1985-1994. The fact that
this was a longitudinal analysis that tested Thomas's theories
distinguishes it from past works that have examined the affect
female justices may have on state appellate courts. Public law
scholars have yet to test either of Thomas's theories in relation to
women on the court.
Literature Review
Political Science and Women's Studies scholars have
advanced a variety of theoretical perspectives to justify the need for
a more representative bench at both the state 'and federal level.
Proponents of descriptive representation assert that if state and
federal courts are to be perceived as legitimate, no segment of the
nation's diverse population can be excluded from court
membership. No exclusion can be based on arbitrary
characteristics such as race or sex. A court system that does not
reflect the membership of society breeds increasingly higher levels
of disaffection and disillusionment. Thus, as more women are
placed on the bench, the democratic regime is strengthened. This
perspective of inclusiveness, however, views the ,placement of
women on the bench to be by and large symbolic. While it is
concerned with retooling and redefining a democratic process that
4 The liberal and egalitarian underpinnings of descriptive representation
necessarily makes this so. This line of reasoning argues for granting women the
opportunity to ascend to the state and federal benches because to deny them on
the basis of their sex would be unjust.
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prevents women from participating and competing on equal terms
with white males in the public sphere, it does not hold that women
will speak with a uniquely feminine voice once on the bench. 5
In contrast, a strand of feminist theory, a strand that
decidedly breaks away from the fundamental tenets of liberalism,
asserts that the integration of women into the legal system will
transform our traditional understanding of the law. Supporters of
this perspective encompass a number of different names (maternal
feminists, cultural feminists, social feminists, and difference
feminists).6 Nonetheless, they share the view that women can
bring to the public sphere a unique style of problem solving and
decision-making.
The term "different voice," made popular by Gilligan,
describes the differences in the way males and females understand
themselves and their environment. Gilligan's work runs counter to
conventional wisdom by positing and then demonstrating that
women tend to al~proach moral dilemmas in a manner that is
distinct from men. Gilligan found that women tend to perceive
morality more in terms of an interconnected web or an ethic of
care. In contrast, men tend to view morality more in hierarchical
terms, emphasizing and placing higher premiums on abstractions,
rights, rules, autonomy, separation and formality. Accordingly,
Gilligan maintains that women tend not to view themselves in
opposition to others, seeing themselves, instead, as inextricably
linked to society. They are more concerned with obligation and
responsibility than rights and rules.s Thus, Gilligan's findings
5 Cass Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REV. 826 (1987)
(reviewing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
6 See generally, NAOMI BLACK, SOCIAL FEMINISM (1989); Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
7 It is important to note that Gilligan's work has been severely criticized on
methodological grounds. See e.g., Sue Davis, Do Women Judges Speak "In A
Different Voice?": Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory and the Ninth Circuit,
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 143 (1992-1993).
s Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon asserts that Americans participate in a type of
discourse that is both a symptom of and a contributing factor to disorder in
American society. According to Glendon, this discourse, known as "rights talk"
is unduly simplistic, legalistic in character, implicitly absolute, hyper-
individualistic, insular, and does not speak of either personal or collective
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attack the assumption that the masculine style of resolving moral
dilemmas is one that all human beings practice. 9 To temper the
wholly male-centered view, Gilligan supports the integration of
women and women's experiences into all aspects of phallocentric
public life.
A Different Voice: Gayle Binion 10
Supporting an integration of the feminine perspective,
Gayle Binion applies different voice theory to the arena of law. In
her work Toward a Feminist Regrounding of Constitutional Law
(1991), Binion argues that integrating women's experience into
constitutional analysis may allow for a different understanding of
constitutional rights to emerge. For instance, a different voice
perspective, or in Binion's own terminology a "progressive
jurisprudence" would "reject such abstract foundations for liberty
as social contract," viewing such abstractions as by and large
irrelevant to concrete human experiences." Moreover, it would
recognize that such abstractions generally are based on what
"reasonable" or "rational"(white) men would tend to do and to
what conditions of civilization they would tend to consent. In
contrast, progressive jurisprudence would find a right to liberty in a
concrete understanding of societal experiences where the collective
experiences were reinforced by the personal. According to Binion,
a progressive jurisprudence would also reject the libertarian
proposition that liberty is inversely related to the exercise of
government power. It would recognize, instead, that individuals
are not always able to prevent "private" others from acquiring
power over them. In the case of women, they often experience
powerlessness vis-h-vis their everyday environment, requiring the
state to step in on their behalf.
responsibility. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLTICAL DISCOURSE (199 1).
9 Different voice feminists argue that such a male-centered bias ignores women's
concrete experiences.
10 See Gayle Binion, Toward a Feminist Regrounding of Constitutional Law, 72
Soc. ScI. Q. (1991).
" Id. at 213
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A Different Voice: Robin West
Robin West, in her work titled Jurisprudence and
Gender,12 supports the integration into the law of the theoretical
propositions expressed by both different voice theory and radical
feminism. According to West, the law is irretrievably masculine
because it is founded on the separation thesis. The separation
thesis states that the individual exists separate from society. Such a
description of human existence does not mirror women's concrete
experiences. As the cultural feminists maintain, women, unlike the
sexless-- but undoubtedly masculine-- individual characterized by
liberal legalists and critical legalists, value intimacy and fear
separation, while at the same time dread the invasion (or
penetration) as the radical feminists claim.
A Different Voice: Sue Thomas
Some political scientists have started to test whether the
perspectives articulated by Gilligan, Binion and West play out in
the political and judicial arena. Implicit in Thomas's
groundbreaking text, How Women Legislate, is the different voice
perspective. According to Thomas, "women legislators, despite
pursuing the spectrum of political issues and sitting on a range of
available committees, have developed their own distinctive set of
priorities."'13 Specifically, women legislators emphasize women's
issues, children and the family. Male legislators historically have
tended not to champion these issues. These issues by and large
have been associated with the private sphere. Female legislators
support bills relating to "women's issues" by playing a proactive
role in their sponsorship. They make every effort to ensure that the
issues become public policy. Thus, according to Thomas, the
inclusion of women in the legislative arena has altered state
legislatures' traditional agendas.
The critical mass theory is one of Thomas's most
significant contributions to the study of gender and politics.
12 West, supra note 6.
13 Thomas, supra 3, at 7.
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Thomas asserts that in environments where higher proportions of
women are present, female legislators are more likely to develop
women centered policy priorities. Thomas's findings confirm that,
"reduced conformity pressures and increased support for distinctive
behavior were advanced in places where proportions of women
were highest."' 4 In contrast, in those legislative environments
where women were nearly absent, female representatives tended to
repress or abandon dissonant behaviors altogether.
Although the findings support the critical mass theory,
Thomas warns that her conclusions should not be seen as
definitive. Past research has found that in statehouses where
women represented twenty-five percent or more of the legislators,
only about forty percent of the women championed so called
''women's issues." These findings suggest that there may be a
critical point where "individual women legislators no longer feel as
strong a personal responsibility to represent women."' 5 If this is
indeed the case, the advancement of more women to state
legislatures, in fact, may mute the different voice currently
attributed to women representatives.
Public Law Scholarship and A Different Voice
Although political scientists have placed a greater emphasis
upon finding a different voice in the legislative arena than in the
legal realm, public law scholars have begun to investigate whether
gender matters on both the federal and state bench. At best, recent
studies have produced mixed results. Suzanna Sherry, in her article
titled Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, analyzed the decision making of Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to determine whether she evinced a
different voice. Sherry concluded that the lone female justice (at
that time) tended to emphasize connection, context, and
14 1d. at 122
15 Id. at 154. See also Lyn Kathlene, Power and Influence in State Legislative
Policy Making: The Interaction of Gender and Positions in Committee Hearing
Debates, 88 AM. POL Sci. REv. (1994). Kathlene's findings indicate that as the
proportion of women increases in legislative bodies, men will become more
verbally aggressive and controlling of committee hearings.
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responsibility, over rights. 16 Sherry's analysis also suggested that
O'Connor was less willing than other conservative justices to
permit the violations of the right to full membership in the
community. However, in The Voice of Sandra Day O'Connor, Sue
Davis critiques Sherry's conclusion's maintaining that O'Connor
may simply be less conservative than Rehnquist. Davis suggests
that O'Connor possibly diverges from Rehnquist on civil rights
issues because as a victim of past discrimination herself O'Connor
is sensitive to the claims of traditionally disadvantaged groups.
In another study, Voting Behavior and Gender on the
United States Courts of Appeal, Sue Davis, Susan B. Haire, and
Donald R. Songer is examined the voting behavior of women on
United States Courts of Appeal in three specific policy areas:
employment discrimination, search and seizure, and obscenity.
The analysis initially demonstrated significant differences between
male and female Court of Appeals judges in two of three areas-
employment discrimination and search and seizure cases.
However, when appointing President's party was controlled for in
search and seizure cases, 19 the difference between male and female
voting patterns disappeared. Thus, in only employment
discrimination cases did the authors find support for the thesis that
women judges bring a different perspective to the bench.
Nonetheless, they warned that against drawing broad conclusions.
Women judges might support plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases solely because they identify with the members
of the subordinate group, not because they are expressing a
distinctly feminine voice.
16 Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
17 Sue Davis, The Voice of Sandra Day O'Connor, 77 JUDICATURE 134, 137
(1993). Davis's findings that O'Connor's voting behavior in criminal procedure
cases was significantly more liberal than Rehnquist's support this contention.
IS Sue Davis, Susan Haire, & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender
on the United States Courts of Appeal, 77 JUDICATURE 3 (1993).
19 The appointing president is used as a surrogate for the justice's political
ideology. Justices appointed by Democratic presidents tend to be more liberal
and justices appointed by Republican presidents tend to be more conservative.
2000-2001
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David W. Allen and Diane E. Wall, in their article Role
Orientation of Women State Supreme Court Justices, hypothesized
that female judges would adopt one of four distinctive role
orientations while on the bench. These roles included the
representative, the token, the outsider or the different voice role.
20
They found that female justices were more likely to take on
the representative role when confronted with women's issues and
less likely to exhibit a different voice orientation altogether.
Building upon past work, Donald R. Songer and Kelley A.
Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in
State Supreme Courts, examined the voting behavior of State
Supreme Court judges from 1970-1993 in four substantive areas of
law: gender discrimination, obscenity, death penalty sentencing,
and environmental policy. This research concluded that when
party, region, and selection system are controlled for, women
judges tend to vote more liberally than their male colleagues.
21
This cursory look at past attempts to determine the effects
of gender on judicial decision-making demonstrates the difficulty
of proving women jurists exhibit a different voice. Nonetheless,
public law scholars seem unwilling to dismiss the notion of a
different voice entirely. Perhaps, in line with Thomas's work, they
recognize that the number of women holding appellate judgeships
remains small and that a manifestation of a different voice may
only occur when the number of women on appellate courts reaches
a critical mass.
20 David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, Role Orientations and Women State
Supreme Court Justices, 77 JUDICATURE 3 (1993). Female judges taking on a
representative orientation would demonstrate a "pro women" record when it
came to cases centering on women's issues. Female judges who adopted the
token role would "modify their behavior to conform to the dominant majority."
In contrast, outsiders would exhibit extreme behavior. An extension of the
outsider role would be the different voice orientation where female judges
exhibit extremism and isolation in voting behavior.
21 Donald R. Songer & Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter?
Decision Making in State Supreme Courts (1996) (paper presented at the Annual





Because it was the first state appellate court where a
majority of women sat on the bench, the Minnesota State Supreme
Court was selected as the sole subject of this study. 22 Data were
collected over a ten-year period (1985-1994). Approximately 1250
unanimous and non-unanimous cases were examined. The ten-year
period encompassed seven natural courts.23 Each of which
consisted of seven members. A total of thirteen justices sat on the
bench during the period of analysis-four of which were women.
The women justices included Rosalie Wahl, M. Jeanne Coyne,
Esther Tomljanovich, and Sandra S. Gardebring. The Minnesota
citizenry selects its State Supreme Court justices through
nonpartisan elections; however, all but two of the justices, Peterson
and Page, were appointed. A Democratic governor appointed
Justices Yetka, Scott, Wahl, Popovich, Keith and Tomljanovich;
whereas, a Republican governor placed on the bench Justices
Simonett, Amdahl, Kelley, Coyne, and Gardebring.
There are three central objectives of this analysis. The first
objective is to apply and test Thomas's different voice and critical
mass theory in the judicial arena. Thomas asserts that in
environments where higher proportions of women are present,
female legislators are more likely to develop women-centered
policy priorities. This paper seeks to determine (1) do women
justices tend to emphasize women's issues and (2) are female
justices more likely to demonstrate dissonant behavior as more
women come onto the bench.
The second objective of this paper is to explore whether
female judges may exhibit a different voice without dissenting.
For the most part, past research has focused exclusively on
majority opinions or dissents to determine if women judges exhibit
22 It is recognized that there are methodological difficulties associated with
studying a single court. However, the purpose of this paper is to explore the
utility of Sue Thomas's critical mass theory with respect to the judicial arena.
23 Natural courts are identified by the membership on the court. Each time the
membership changes, there is a new natural court.
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a different voice. 24  In contrast, this paper maintains that a
uniquely feminine voice is as likely to come in the form of a
concurrence, as it is to come in the form of a dissent. Judges draft
concurring opinions when they agree with the outcome the
majority has reached, but not necessarily with the majority's legal
reasoning. Since different voice theory looks at how women
approach moral and legal dilemmas and what rationale they use to
resolve those dilemmas, to disregard concurrences when testing a
different voice theory is to ignore the fact that male and female
judges can reach the same decisional outcomes but for different
reasons.
The third objective of this paper is to assess whether female
justices on the Minnesota State Supreme Court tend to use a
different style of reasoning as Gilligan, Binion, and West suggest.
The question simply stated is: do women justices, especially in
areas of the law that could be considered to be women-centered,
tend to focus on the concrete realities and experiences of the
plaintiffs over legal abstractions and rules?
Below are the specific hypotheses that were developed for
measuring these objectives:
Hypothesis #1: Female justices will demonstrate unity across all
types of cases, but female justices should demonstrate more unity
in legal matters directly affecting women as a category.
Hypothesis #2: As the number of women increased on the court,
the number of women-centered cases should increase.
Hypothesis #3: As the number of women increased on the court,
the willingness of female jurist to express dissonance should
increase.
24 As an example, in the 1993 Allen & Wall study, "a different voice" role was
operationalized as when female justices exhibited "extremism and isolation in
dissenting behavior." Allen & Wall, supra note 20, at 159. Contra Davis, supra
note 17 (where she examines both concurring and dissenting opinions in her
analysis of Justice O'Connor's voting behavior).
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Hypothesis #4: Female justices are as likely to use a concurrence as
a vehicle for expressing a different voice as a dissent.
Hypothesis #5: Female justices will tend to reject legal abstractions
and focus on concrete human experiences. Moreover female
justices will focus on responsibility, obligations, and duty over
rights and rules.
Findings
First the degree to which female judges were unified across
all types of cases was determined. Then the number of times a
female judge sided with a member of her sex in non-unanimous
criminal law and family law cases was assessed. It was
hypothesized that for Thomas's different voice theory to hold that
the female justices would tend to agree with one another in family
law cases,25 despite differences in political orientation. However,
when it came to criminal law cases the level of agreement between
female justices would tend to depend more upon their political
orientation than their sex.
25 Family law cases were used as a surrogate for women-centered issues.
2000-2001
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TABLE 1
DEGREE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN FEMALE JUSTICE
Year 50% 66% 75% 100%
(2 of 4) (2of 3) (3of 4) (ALL)
1985
2 female NA NA NA 62.5
justices
1986
2 female NA NA NA 58.1
justices
1987
2 female NA NA NA 75.0
justices
1988
2 female NA NA NA 43.5
justices
1989
2 female NA NA NA 50.0
justices
1990
3 female NA 13.5 NA 43.2
justices
1991
3 & 4 female 17.6 17.6 35.3 29.4
justices
1992
4 female 36.8 NA 52.6 10.5
justices
1993
4 female 25.0 NA 58.3 16.7
justices
1994
4 female 25.0 NA 25.0 50.0
justices
Table 1, above, indicates the degree to which female justice
agreed with one another across all non-unanimous cases. Not
surprisingly, the level of agreement between the female justices
was at its highest when only two women were on the bench. From
1985 to 1989, the number of cases where Wahl and Coyne agreed
FEMININE JURISPRUDENCE
with one another never fell below 50 percent. In 1987, Wahl and
Coyne were in agreement with one another in 75 percent of the
cases. This is somewhat noteworthy in light of the fact that a
Democratic governor appointed Wahl and a Republican governor
selected Coyne. However, in 1993, with the appointment of
Gardebring and Tomljanovich the degree of unanimity between the
female justices fell sharply hitting a low of 16.7 percent.
Interestingly enough, the level of unanimous agreement between
the four female justices nearly tripled a year later, peaking at 50
percent.26 Despite the fact that the degree of unanimity decreased
as more women came on the court, Table I demonstrates that three
of four female justices agreed with one another as much as 58
percent of the time.
Criminal and family law cases were selected to determine
the level of agreement between female justices across particular
issue areas. The data indicate that over a ten-year period that a
higher degree of consensus was evidenced among the members of
the court (both male and female) when it came to criminal law and
family law cases. The court was unanimous a little over 83 percent
of the time in criminal law cases and about 81 percent of the time
in family law cases.
As indicated above, past research has suggested that the
type of issues that come before a court may affect the level of
agreement between female justices. The difference between the
unity rates in non-unanimous family law and criminal law for the
Minnesota justices further strengthens these past findings. The
female justices were most unified when it came to non-unanimous
family law cases. They agreed with one another nearly 90 percent
of the time. This is even higher than the unanimity rate of 81
percent for the entire court. In contrast, the female justices were in
agreement with one another only 25 percent of the time in non-
unanimous criminal cases. The female justices, despite differences
in their political affiliations, seem to exhibit a uniquely feminine
voice in matters concerning family law. They lack the same
unified voice when dealing with criminal law cases.
26 The explanation for this significant increase should be explored at a later date.
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Analyzing how supportive each of the female justices were
toward the State's case in criminal cases over a ten year period,
further helps to explain the dissonance between the female justices
in criminal cases as compared to family law cases. In 92 percent of
the non-unanimous criminal law cases that Coyne presided over
she sided with the state; Gardebring supported the state in just a
little over 50 percent; and both Wahl and Tomljanovich deferred to
the state in just over 40 percent of the cases.
The opinions rendered by Wahl and Tomljanovich
invariably supported the individual defendant. Since Wahl served
as Assistant State Public Defender before becoming a justice, her
willingness to protect the rights of the individual over the power of
the state is not altogether surprising. The same Democratic
governor appointed Tomljanovich. Republican governors,
however, appointed both Coyne and Gardebring. Together the
above findings lend support to Hypothesis #1 that while female
justices will not be in agreement with one another all of the time or
across all categories of cases, in areas of law affecting women as a
category we can expect higher levels of agreement between the
female justices.
To determine if the increase in the number of women
justices on .the court influenced the likelihood that the Court would
hear cases involving women-centered issues, data provided by the
Research and Planning Unit of the Minnesota Judicial Center were
examined.
The data in Table 2, below, indicates that although the
number of family law case filings increased each year (except in
1992 where the number of case filings fell from 76 to 49), the court
did not subsequently dispose of a greater percentage of family law
cases. In fact as more women came onto the court, the number of





NUMBER OF FAMILY LAW CASES
FILED & DISPOSED OF BY YEAR
Year Number Number Percent
Filed Disposed Disposed
1985 42 9 .21
1986 52 4 .07
1987 70 8 .11
1988 61 10 .16
1989 70 9 .13
1990 65 6 .09
1991 76 2 .03
1992 49 3 .06
1993 80 8 .10
1994 67 4 .06
The rate of concurrences and dissents authored by the
female were examined to test whether the female justices were
more willing to contest the opinions of their male colleagues as
more women were appointed to the court. To do this analysis a
longitudinal study was conducted using data from 1985 to 1994.
As of 1985, Wahl already had sat on the court for eight years.
Coyne had been on the court for over two years. In 1990,
Tomljanovich joined the court and was quickly followed by
Gardebring who joined the court in 1991.
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF NON-UNANIMOUS OPINIONS BY YEAR
N Percent of











The data from the longitudinal analysis suggest that the
Minnesota State Supreme Court, like most collegial bodies, tends
towards unanimity. From 1985 to 1994, the percent of non-
unanimous opinions never surpassed 22.1 percent. In fact, 1994 has
the lowest percentage of non-unanimous decisions (8.9 percent).
However, beginning in 1992 one year after the fourth female
justice was appointed to the bench, the percent of non-unanimous
decisions begins to drop dramatically, falling from 20 percent in
1991 to 15.6 percent in 1992 to 10.1 percent in 1993. Interestingly,
as women reached a majority on the bench the over-all level of




PERCENTAGE OF DISSENTING OPINIONS
AUTHORED BY JUSTICE BY YEAR
Justice 1991 1992 1993 1994
Wahl 4 2 2 5
Coyne 6 3 0 0
Gardebring 0 4 3 0
Tomljanovich 6 5 5 2
Page NA 0 2 0
Yetka 4 3 NA NA
Keith 2 0 0 0
Simonett 5 2 0 0
The data in Table 4, above, suggest, however, that after
1991 when females comprised a majority on the court the greatest
percentage of dissents (per year) were written by females. In 1991,
Justices Tomljanovich, Coyne, and Wahl ranked first, second and
fourth in terms of the highest percentage of dissents. In 1992,
Tomljanovich, Gardebring, and Coyne were the top three
dissenters respectively. In 1993, Tomljanovich, Gardebring, and
Wahl ranked first, second, and third. In 1994, Wahl and
Tomijanovich held the first and second rankings. Thus, although
the overall dissonance rate of the court decreased as more women
came on the court, the individual dissonance rate of each of the
female justices increased.
The rate of concurrence for each individual justice was
computed to ascertain whether the female justices used
concurrences as a vehicle for a different voice and whether they
were more likely to concur when one of their male colleagues
drafted the majority opinion.
2000-2001
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TABLE5
NUMBER OF CONCURRENCES AND DISSENTS
AUTHORED BY JUSTICES DURING THEIR TENURE
Justice Sex Concurrences Dissents
Amdahl M 0 2
Coyne F 4 23
Garde* F 0 8
Keith M 2 5
Kelley M 10 21
Page M 1 2
Peter* M 0 1
Popo* M 3 10
Scott M 4 6
Simon* M 21 18
Tom* F 0 17
Wahl F 7 45
Yetka M 10 59
In Table 5, above, the total number and the percentage of
concurring and dissenting opinions that each judge drafted from
1985-1994 are listed. Only three judges, two females (Wahl and
Coyne) and one male (Simonette), sat on the bench for the entire
ten-year period. The aggregate data renders the hypothesis that
women judges may express their uniquely feminine voice by
authoring concurring opinions somewhat moot. In the ten-year
period studied only two of the women, Justice Wahl and Justice
Coyne, authored concurring opinions. Coyne authored four (.03%)
and Wahl drafted 7 (.05%) concurring opinions. It appears that the
female justices on the Minnesota State Supreme Court were more
likely to express dissonance through dissenting opinions. In fact,
two female judges, Wahl and Tomljanovich, wrote a greater
percentage of dissenting opinions (4%) than all but one of their
male counterparts (6%).
Lastly, a textual analysis of selected non-unanimous family
law cases was conducted to assess whether the female justices
exhibited a different voice. The Court heard 63 family law cases
between 1985 and 1994. Only ten of the cases were non-
312 VOL. IX
FEMININE JURISPRUDENCE
unanimous. The female justices agreed with one another in all but
one of the cases. In these ten cases, the female justices authored
two majority and three dissenting opinions. Coyne authored two of
the dissenting opinions. Wahl signed onto both of these opinions.
The other dissenting opinion was a lone dissent authored by Wahl.
Not a single male colleague agreed with any one of these
dissenting opinions. An analysis of the two cases where the female
justices disagreed with their male counterparts was conducted
looking for language that indicated the female justices were
emphasizing concrete human experience over abstract rules.
The language used in these opinions suggests that in the
area of family law Wahl and Coyne may have approached the legal
dilemmas arising from family law cases differently than their male
counterparts. In the cases Karon v. Karon27 and Erickson v.
Erickson28, both Coyne and Wahl were concerned with the impact
of the decision on the losing party. In each of these cases the
majority opinion-authored by men-tended to focus on rules,
processes and regulations. In contrast, the dissenting opinions
focused either on the responsibility of a husband to a wife even
after the marriage had been dissolved or on an obligation of a
father to abide by the original intent of a child support contract
even after his wife's circumstances had changed.
In Karon v. Karon, Coyne and Wahl took umbrage with her
brethren's contention that once marital maintenance had been
waived it could not be reinstated, stating:
Consider that not unlikely event that a woman
entering into a stipulation identical to that
presented, shortly thereafter suffers a totally
disabling illness that threatens to exhaust all of her
available resources and that, during the same period,
her former husband enjoys a substantial increase in
income.
29
27435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989).
2 449 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. 1989).
29 435 N.W.2d 501.
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Thus, Justices Coyne and Wahl were more interested in
how waiving modification of maintenance order would affect the
individual litigants than they were in the procedural grounds that
such a waiver rests upon.
Similarly, in Erickson, Justices Coyne and Wahl dissented
when the majority upheld the termination of maintenance upon
remarriage of the wife and the amendment of child support in light
of the wife's increased prosperity. Justice Coyne wrote:
In light of the majority's recognition of the actual
purpose of the agreement, I am utterly confounded
by its disposition of this matter: remanding for
termination of maintenance rather than effectuating
the actual intent of the parties . . . Neither can I
agree with the majority's apparent acceptance of the
appellant's contention that amendment of the decree
constitutes a change of circumstances which
relieves him of his contractual obligations.
30
The dissenting opinions from the above cases seemingly
exemplify Gilligan, Binion, and West's contention women (and in
this case women justices) tend resolve moral dilemmas differently
than their male counterparts. In these cases, the female justices
appeared to be more concerned with responsibility, obligation, and
the concrete reality of the parties involved in the litigation. In
contrast, their male counterparts appear to rely more upon rule and
procedural based justifications.
Discussion
A central objective of this research was to test Thomas's
different voice and critical mass theories in the judicial arena. The
findings of this research suggest that the level of cohesiveness
between female justices was directly affected by issue area. Female
justices demonstrated a greater degree of agreement in family law
cases and a lesser degree of cohesion in criminal law cases. The
30 449 N.W.2d 173.
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female justices were not only remarkably unified when it came to
family law cases, they also were more likely to take the lead by
either drafting a majority or a dissenting opinion in these types of
cases. Moreover, initial support is given for the hypothesis that
women justices will tend to be more unified and exhibit a different
voice in legal matters directly affecting women as a category or in
issues relating to the private sphere.
There was little evidence to support our hypothesis that the
court was more willing to hear family law cases, as more women
justices were appointed to the bench. However, our interest was
piqued by the fact that as more women were appointed, more
family law cases were filed. Thus, before we discount this
particular operationalization of Thomas's theory, we need to
explore if the mere presence of a majority of women on the court
influenced petitioners' willingness to file. We also need to
determine whether the court was more willing to hear other types
of women-centered cases (such as cases relating to sexual violence
and sexual discrimination), as more women advanced to the
bench. 3'
We also found that as the number of women increased on
the court, so to did their willingness to express themselves.
Although the level of consensus for the court as a whole increased
as more women were placed on the bench, the female justices also
began to dissent more frequently. Thus, increasing the number of
women on the court apparently helped to make the court both more
collegial and a safer place for women justices to express
dissonance.
Another central theme of our analysis was to determine if
female justices might express a different voice without dissenting.
Concurrences were rarely used as a vehicle by the female justices
on the Minnesota State Supreme Court to express any voice, let
alone a different voice. Female justices, on the whole, either
agreed with both the outcome of and the legal reasoning behind a
decision or they disagreed with the decision altogether. Despite this
finding, future research in this area should not ignore concurrences.
31 Furthermore, we suggest that because women were only the majority for such
a brief period, that they may not have had the time to influence the court docket
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As more women are either appointed or elected to State Appellate
Courts, public law scholars interested in assessing whether female
jurists evidence a different voice will need to continue to examine
female justices concurrences as well as their dissents.
Conclusion
Using a distinct data set, different voice theories were
tested within a legal context. Given the fact that the data were
drawn from a single State Supreme Court, any conclusions are
necessarily tentative. However, several findings support the need
to further test Thomas's theories with respect to the judicial arena
and female jurists. In the case of the Minnesota State Supreme
Court, it appears that the female justices were more willing to
dissent once more females were appointed. Furthermore, the
female justices, despite holding different political orientations,
evidenced a higher level of agreement (even more so than the court
generally) when deciding family law cases. Together these
findings suggest the need to further explore whether the increase in
number of women justices on state appellate courts will affect
these courts, the members of these courts, and the law in much the
same way that state legislatures were influenced by the growing
presence of female legislators.
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